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n 13 December European Leaders will sign 
the “Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty 
on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community”.  Some 
commentators already take its long title to mean that 
it may not be quite the ‘mini-treaty’ Nicolas 
Sarkozy had promised, and much of the public 
debate on the text has focussed on the question of 
‘how much constitution’ it still contains. This paper 
intends to provide a concise overview of the most 
important innovations introduced by the Treaty of 
Lisbon (ToL), comparing it at the same time to the 
abandoned Constitutional Treaty (CT).
1  
I.  General Points 
Before addressing the treaty’s substance, there needs 
to be some comment on how agreement was reached 
on this text. Looking back, the road to the new 
treaty has been a long and bumpy one (see box on 
page 2). After eight years of continuous reform 
debate, a convention, difficult intergovernmental 
negotiations and two failed referenda, most 
governments now just want to close the institutional 
dossier and concentrate on policy issues. However, 
in contrast to the numerous self-congratulatory 
                                                 
1 For a further analysis see the CEPS-EPC-Egmont-study, 
“The Treaty of Lisbon: Implementing the Institutional 
Innovations”, November 2007 (http://shop.ceps.eu/ 
BookDetail.php?item_id=1554). 
remarks on this agreement, it is clear that when the 
ToL is signed on 13 December, it will only have 
reached the same stage as the CT did back in 
October 2004. Despite the fact that French and 
Dutch electorates will most likely not be consulted 
this time, the forthcoming ratification phase may 
still hold surprises that provide for a high degree of 
unpredictability.  
The main lesson that leaders seem to have drawn 
from the ratification of the CT appears to be “No 
more referenda!”, as they are making every effort to 
pass the treaty through national parliaments. At 
present, Ireland is the only member state set to hold 
a referendum and even the Irish vote is not the result 
of a deliberate political choice, but rather 
constitutional obligations. The fact that Dutch and 
French citizens are not consulted again will certainly 
not play in favour of the Treaty in the Irish 
campaign. Also, political developments in some 
member states (especially the UK) remain hard to 
predict, which could then have a knock-on effect in 
other countries. 
1.  Another Amending Treaty (unlike CT) 
Maybe the most significant change in substance 
from the CT is the return to the instrument of 
‘amending treaties’. This implicitly means giving up 
on one of the core aims of the CT: making the EU’s 
legal framework more coherent and transparent. 
According to its article IV-437, the CT would have 
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repealed and replaced the existing treaties. In 
contrast, the ToL changes them, just like the Treaty 
of Amsterdam or the Treaty of Nice did in the past. 
In this respect, the ToL is thus a step ‘back to the 
future’. Using an architectural metaphor, the ToL 
continues to add new attachments to the existing 
‘main building’ and thus contributes further to the 
Union’s Byzantine legal structure. 
2.  Demolition of the pillar structure (like 
CT, but specificity of CFSP stressed) 
Just like the CT, the ToL will formally abolish the 
current ‘three-pillar-structure’ of the EU. This 
means that (at least formally) the special 
instruments applied in Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (‘second pillar’) and in police and 
judicial cooperation on criminal matters (‘third 
pillar’) will be abandoned. The move towards one 
common framework is also reflected in article 1 
TEU (“The Union shall replace and succeed the 
European Community.”)   
However, the ToL also clearly states that “the 
adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded” from 
CFSP (art. 11 (1) TEU). There will thus be 
‘decisions’ in the area of CFSP, but the term will 
still not mean the same as in other policy areas. 
Unlike the CT, the ToL also states explicitly that 
“the common foreign and security is subject to 
specific rules and procedures” (art. 11 (1) TEU). 
The specificity of CFSP is further underlined by two 
new Declarations, one of which clarifies that the 
provisions on CFSP “do not give new powers to the 
Commission to initiate decisions nor do they 
increase the role of the European Parliament.”  
The second pillar is also maintained in view of the 
so-called ‘flexibility clause’. Article 308 TEC will 
in principle apply beyond the current first pillar in 
the future, but the ToL now explicitly excludes its 
application for CFSP matters.  
If one accepts that the word ‘pillar’ signifies a 
distinct set of decision-making rules, the second 
pillar will thus de facto largely be maintained. 
Compared to the CT, the ToL has increased the 
safeguards against possible ‘spill-overs’ from 
‘communitarised’ decision-making. 
** 
The following two sections give an overview of the 
changes introduced to the two main texts by the 
ToL:  
-  the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and  
-  the Treaty establishing the European Community 
(TEC). 
Chronological Overview: The long road to Lisbon 
•  26 February 2001: Signing of the Treaty of Nice 
(generally perceived as a ‘lowest common 
denominator’ that would require further treaty 
reform); ratification starts immediately, but rejected in 
a first Irish referendum (7 June 2001); approved in a 
second referendum (19 October 2002); entry into 
force on 17 February 2003 
•  14/15 December 2001: European Council (EC) at 
Laeken decides to refer the preparation of the next 
treaty reform to a ‘Convention on the Future of   
Europe’ presided by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing 
•  28 February 2002: Convention starts work 
•  20/21 June 2003: “Draft Treaty on a Constitution for 
Europe” (CT) presented to the EC in Thessaloniki; EC 
considers it as a “good basis for initiating the 
Intergovernmental Conference” (IGC) 
•  4 October 2003: IGC begins officially 
•  13 December 2004: IGC fails to find agreement at 
Brussels summit, mainly due to opposition from 
Poland and Spain to the proposed system of voting 
weights in the Council 
•  18 June 2004: Political agreement reached under the 
Irish EU presidency 
•  29 October 2004: Heads of State sign CT in Rome; 
ratification begins 
•  20 February 2005: Yes-vote in referendum in Spain  
•  29 May and 1 June 2005: No-votes in France & the 
Netherlands 
•  10 June: Yes-vote in Luxembourg 
•  16/17 June 2005: EC calls for ‘Period of Reflection’; 
several MS put ratification on hold (CT never ratified 
by CZ, DK, FR, IRL, NL, PL, PT, SE,UK) while 
others continue 
•  15/16 June 2006: EC asks German EU-presidency 
(1st half of 2007) to present a report “that should 
contain an assessment of the state of discussion with 
regard to the [CT] and explore possible future 
developments” 
•  21/22 June 2007: EC agrees mandate for IGC on a 
‘Reform Treaty’ and decides to open IGC 
•  5 October 2007: First full draft of new treaty 
presented 
•  18/19 October 2007: Informal Summit in Lisbon 
agrees on remaining points 
•  13 December 2007: Signing ceremony in Lisbon 
•  Ratification in all MS; entry into force foreseen for 
1 January 2009 (before next EP-elections) 
II.  The Treaty on European Union 
As amended by the ToL, the future TEU will be 
divided into the following six ‘Titles’: 
•  I. General Provisions (mostly amendments to the 
old TEU) 
•  II. Democratic Principles (new title, mostly 
from CT)  
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•  III. Institutions (new title from CT; modified 
‘double majority’ voting rules) 
•  IV. Enhanced cooperation (mostly amendments 
to old TEU; formerly Title VII TEU) 
•  V. External Action & CFSP (mostly amendments 
to old TEU) 
•  VI. Final Provisions (mostly amendments to old 
TEU, formerly Title VIII TEU) 
While four titles are in fact amended versions of 
existing titles of the TEU, Title II and III are taken 
almost entirely from the CT. As a consequence of 
the abolition of the current ‘third pillar’, the former 
Title VI TEU on ‘police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters’ is integrated into Title IV of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU),
2 where the provisions of the already 
‘communitarised’ parts on justice and home affairs 
(e.g. visa, asylum, immigration) are located. The 
ToL will thus lead to one common title on Justice 
and Home Affairs. 
1.  General Provisions (Title I TEU) 
1.1  Provisions on values and objectives of the 
EU (mostly like CT) 
The current Title I of the TEU is substantially 
amended with provisions that have already been 
included in the CT. For example, the reference to 
the “cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of 
Europe” is taken from the CT’s preamble. The 
articles on the EU’s values and objectives are also 
taken on board. Contrary to the CT, the ToL does 
not introduce ‘undistorted competition’ as a new 
objective of the EU. One should bear in mind 
however, that the current treaties do not include this 
objective either. ‘Undistorted competition’ is 
currently mentioned in article 3g TEC as an 
‘activity’ of the Union, which will in the future only 
be included in a protocol (thus also legally binding). 
This has triggered concern about future Court 
rulings giving less weight to undistorted 
competition,
3 while the author of this paper is of the 
view that this is an unlikely ‘worst case scenario’. 
1.2  Symbols of the EU not mentioned (unlike 
CT) 
A more significant impact on the Union’s future 
could result from the fact that the ToL no longer 
contains articles on the symbols of the EU. This 
                                                 
2 Note that the current Treaty establishing the European 
Community (TEC) is renamed by the ToL as the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
3 See for example Alan Riley, The EU Reform Treaty and 
the Competition Protocol: Undermining EC Competition 
Law, CEPS Policy Brief No. 142, September 2007. 
move to make the treaty look as technical and 
unemotional as possible is clearly motivated by the 
fact that leaders want to play down the significance 
of the treaty and to avoid referenda. It is far from 
clear however whether citizens will buy into that 
argument.  
The omission of European symbols in the treaty text 
does not make a difference from a legal point of 
view and will certainly not lead to the abolition of 
the European flag or anthem in practice. However, it 
demonstrates that European leaders have given up 
on the attempt to provide the EU with any kind of 
‘social legitimacy’ or emotional attachment – 
something already sorely lacking at present. In this 
respect, those who see the Union as another tool in 
the box of the nation state have clearly won the case, 
which is unlikely to be without consequence for the 
prospects of future integration.
4 (In this context it 
should be mentioned that at least the outcome of the 
French referendum was not primarily motivated by 
fear of a European ‘super state’, as surveys show 
that most French people actually voted ‘no’ for a 
lack of EU legislative action in the field of social 
protection.
5) 
1.3  Reference to the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (functionally like CT) 
Article 6 of the TEU makes a clear reference to the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and states that it 
“shall have the same legal value as the treaties”. As 
such it becomes legally binding, just as it would 
have when it still was Part II of the CT. The fact that 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights is not directly 
incorporated into the treaty text anymore is 
motivated by the same concerns for which the 
symbols have been abandoned. Britain and Poland 
have negotiated opt-outs from the Charter that 
exclude its application by national and European 
Courts when this would contradict national laws or 
practices. 
1.4 Explicit  primacy  of EU law not mentioned 
(unlike CT) 
The fact that the ToL will not introduce an explicit 
reference to the primacy of EU law over national 
law is likely to be of minor importance. Instead a 
“Declaration concerning primacy” has been annexed 
to the treaty that clearly confirms the status quo, i.e. 
the well-established case-law of the European Court 
                                                 
4 See also Sebastian Kurpas and Justus Schönlau, 
Deadlock avoided, but sense of mission lost? The 
Enlarged EU and its Uncertain Constitution, CEPS 
Policy Brief No. 92, February 2006. 
5 See Flash Eurobaromètre 171, La Constitution 
européenne – Sondage post-référendum en France, juin 
2005, p. 17/18 (http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/ 
fl171_fr.pdf).  
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of Justice that has never been contested by member 
states.
6 If, for whatever reason, member states 
should start to contest this principle, the EU would 
find itself in deep crisis. 
1.5  Relations between the Union and Member 
States (mostly like CT) 
Article 3a of the TEU is mostly taken from the CT. 
It contains one sentence stating that “[The Union] 
shall respect [Member States’] essential State 
functions…” As this sentence does not conclusively 
define what “essential State functions” are, it leaves 
room for further interpretation. Unlike the CT, the 
ToL will introduce an additional phrase that further 
stresses national sovereignty (“In particular, national 
security remains the sole responsibility of each 
Member State.”). 
1.6  Relations between the Union and 
neighbouring countries (like CT) 
Art. 7a of the TEU is an exact ‘copy-paste’ of art. I-
57 CT, calling for a “special relationship with 
neighbouring countries” and outlining the 
possibility of the Union to conclude specific 
agreements with the countries concerned. 
2.  Democratic Principles (Title II TEU) 
This new title is essentially taken from the CT 
(article I-45 to I-47 CT). 
2.1  Citizens’ initiative (like CT) 
According to this provision of participatory 
democracy “one million citizens who are nationals 
of a significant number of member states” can call 
upon the European Commission to submit a 
proposal on a matter that falls within its area of 
competence. The Commission would not have to 
follow this request, but considerable public pressure 
could be expected in such a case. 
2.2  National Parliaments (stronger than CT) 
A second innovation is included in a new article on 
national parliaments (article 8c TEU). It highlights 
the role of national parliaments in the EU policy 
process and makes reference to the ‘Protocol on the 
Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality’, which was already annexed to the 
CT. This annex includes provisions that grant 
national parliaments the power to kick off a 
procedure for a subsidiarity check. This procedure 
has been strengthened in the ToL in comparison to 
the CT (so called ‘orange card procedure’): If 1/3 of 
national parliaments claim that a particular 
legislative initiative of the Commission breaches the 
principle of subsidiarity, they can demand that the 
                                                 
6 See for example Costa/ENEL, 15 July 1964, Case 
6/641. 
Commission abandon the project. If the 
Commission still proceeds, the initiative can be 
stopped either by 55% of member states in the 
Council or 50% of the votes cast in the European 
Parliament.
7 This instrument is a potentially 
powerful tool, but its effectiveness will largely 
depend on the capacity of national parliaments to 
coordinate their actions within the foreseen deadline 
of eight weeks. There are also concerns that national 
parliaments will focus too strongly on the role of a 
defensive ‘emergency brake’ for EU-legislation, 
instead of becoming more pro-active contributors in 
the European decision-making process. In many 
member states, parliaments still fail to efficiently 
control their respective government in the Council 
and do not sufficiently stimulate public debate on 
policy options at the national level. 
3.  Institutions (Title III TEU) 
Title III clearly contains the greatest number of 
significant innovations. With very few exceptions 
they had already been included in the CT. Elements 
from Title III are therefore also most often cited 
when it is claimed that the ToL was a ‘Constitution 
by the back door’. 
3.1  Permanent European Council President 
(like CT) 
The provision on the European Council President is 
directly taken from the CT. Art. 9 b TEU establishes 
a permanent President of the European Council who 
will be nominated for 2 ½ years, renewable once. 
He/she will be nominated by a qualified majority of 
the members of the European Council and the 
position cannot be combined with any national one. 
On paper the European Council President only has 
limited powers of a mostly procedural nature (e.g. 
chairing European Council meetings), but much will 
depend on the personality that fills the position. 
There are some concerns about potential ‘turf fights’ 
with the Commission President or the new ‘double-
hat’ High Representative for Foreign Affairs. There 
is no clear delimitation of competences on the 
external representation of the Union especially with 
the latter (see art. 9 b (6) TEU). One should also 
note that while the European Council and the 
Foreign Affairs Council receive a permanent chair, 
all other council formations will remain subject to a 
rotating presidency (art. 9c (9) TEU. 
3.2 European  Council and ECB receive 
institutional status (like CT) 
Like the CT, the new treaty will grant the European 
Council and the European Central Bank (ECB) the 
status of a European Institution. Article 9 TEU lays 
                                                 
7 See article 7 of the Protocol on the Application of the 
Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality.  
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out what this status implies in terms of competences 
and obligations. There were some concerns in the 
ECB about its independence in view of the sentence 
“The institutions shall practise mutual sincere 
cooperation.” (art. 9 (2) TEU). 
3.3  Commission President elected by majority 
of European Parliament (like CT) 
As foreseen in the CT, the European Council will 
nominate a candidate by qualified majority “taking 
into account the elections to the European 
Parliament”. In a second step this candidate will 
then be elected by the majority of the component 
members of the European Parliament (article 9 d (7) 
TEU). In many ways this procedure only makes the 
current procedure more visible: already under the 
present treaty provisions, the candidate is 
‘approved’ by the European Parliament. The change 
in wording might raise awareness of the importance 
of European elections, but it must be stressed that 
already after the 2004 elections, the strongest group 
successfully demanded that the Commission 
President had to come from their ranks. In the 
longer term the election of the Commission 
President might give an incentive for a European 
political party to agree on a common candidate. This 
would certainly strengthen the ‘personality factor’ in 
the European election campaign that is currently 
missing. It would make the campaign more 
interesting, which (in view of the traditionally low 
turnout) would certainly be a welcome change. 
3.4  College of Commissioners reduced to 2/3 
of the number of MS (like CT) 
As of 2014 the Commission will be reduced to 2/3 
of the number of member states. The reduction must 
based on a system of “strictly equal rotation” (article 
9d (5) TEU). This means that every third term there 
will not be a Maltese or Luxembourg Commissioner 
just as there will not be a French or German one, i.e. 
regardless of the size of the member state. One 
could argue that this does not matter, since 
Commissioners are not meant to be representative of 
their home country anyway, and should rather 
define (and defend) the common European interest. 
However, the French President Nicolas Sarkozy in 
particular has already voiced concern and suggested 
that the elected Commission President should be 
free to chose his/her team in the future. Certainly 
this suggestion was also motivated by the (probably 
realistic) belief that a Commission President would 
not dare to ignore a French candidate for his/her 
team. The system of equal rotation still needs to be 
implemented through a unanimous Council decision 
before 2014. With the rest of the treaty already in 
force by then, the requirement for unanimity will 
still give large member states an opportunity to 
block the implementation and demand a treaty 
change on this point. 
3.5  ‘Double-hat’ High Representative/Vice-
President of the Commission (like CT, 
except the title) 
In the CT this position was called ‘Foreign 
Minister’. Besides its ‘new old’ name (“High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy”, article 9e TEU), it remains exactly 
the same construct in the ToL: Like the Foreign 
Minister, it essentially entails a ‘merger’ between 
the current High Representative (Solana) and the 
Commissioner for External Relations (Ferrero-
Waldner). Additionally the new ‘double-hat’ HR 
will also chair the Foreign Affairs Council and 
become the Vice-President of the Commission. 
He/she will however not be the Secretary-General of 
the Council anymore. The ‘double-hat’ structure is 
intended to bring together the visibility and political 
clout of the current HR with the resources of the 
Commission. Many issues still need to be clarified 
and there remains some nervousness that the new 
structure might lead to an ‘intergovernmentali-
sation’ of the Commission’s external competences, 
or – on the contrary – to the ‘communitarisation’ of 
the CFSP (despite the safeguards mentioned above). 
In the end much will depend on the personality of 
the person holding this office. There are also some 
unclear legal aspects. (For example, what happens to 
the HR, if the Commission has to step down and 
then a new one comes to office? Will he/she then 
also have to give up his/her office in the Council?) 
3.6  Double-majority voting system (based on 
CT, but amendments) 
The double majority system is the only institutional 
element that has undergone substantial changes in 
comparison to the arrangement of the CT. Once 
meant to make the voting system in the Council 
clearer and more transparent, one could hardly claim 
progress on this aspect anymore. The complicated 
amendments to the initial provision in the CT are 
due to strong opposition from the former Polish 
government under the then Prime Minister Jarosław 
Kaczynski. The Polish would have preferred to keep 
the rather arbitrary Nice voting rules of the current 
treaties and then put forward a so-called ‘square-
root’-system as a possible compromise. In the end 
numerous transitional and safeguard clauses have 
been introduced, but the essential concept of the 
double-majority system from the CT has been 
preserved. It means that the weight of each national 
vote is based on two elements that weigh in equally: 
(1) each country counts as one – regardless of its 
population; (2) each country counts according to the 
size of its population. A majority is reached if 55% 
of member states that represent 65% of the EU’s  
6 | Sebastian Kurpas 
population vote in favour (article 9c (4) TEU).
8 The 
Polish government has negotiated, however, that 
this system will now only come into force in 2014 
and until 2017 any member state can still demand to 
apply the current Nice rules, if that country believes 
a proposal could have been blocked. In addition the 
so-called Ioannina-formula is maintained in a 
revised version in a declaration. It stipulates that if 
there are not sufficient votes to constitute a blocking 
minority, but 75% of the number of countries or 
75% of the population necessary to constitute a 
blocking minority, the issue is to be referred back to 
the Council for further discussion (from 2007 even 
55% will be sufficient). An agreement should then 
be reached within a “reasonable time”. Here again 
the Polish government argued that a “reasonable 
time” could be up to two years, while the other 
governments insisted that it should be three months 
maximum. In the end the Polish government 
abandoned its opposition. 
3.7 Size  of  European  Parliament limited to 
750 members (almost like CT)  
The size of the parliament will be limited to 750 
members, as foreseen by the CT. However, due to 
demands from the Italian government, there will be 
one additional Italian MEP, thus bringing Italy on a 
par with the UK. To get to this result, the President 
of the European Parliament will be counted in 
addition to the 750 other deputies. 
4.  Enhanced cooperation (Title IV TEU) 
As regards this title, several minor changes can be 
detected.
9 While the CT stipulated that 1/3 of 
member states would have to participate in an 
enhanced cooperation, the ToL demands “at least 
nine Member States” (article 10 (2) TEU), which is 
one more than under the current provisions. In view 
of future enlargements, the ToL thus makes it 
(slightly) easier than the CT to start an ‘avantgarde’ 
movement within the treaty framework. This 
mechanism has so far never been used, however, 
and it remains unclear whether it will become an 
attractive alternative to initiatives outside the 
treaties in the future.  
5.  External action (Title V TEU) 
The general clarification that CFSP remains subject 
to specific rules and the double-hat High 
                                                 
8 Where the Council does not act on a proposal from the 
Commission or from the High Representative, the 
qualified majority is defined as at least 72% of member 
states, representing at least 65% of the population, 
according to article 205 (2) TFEU. 
9 For a detailed overview see the Joint Study by CEPS, 
EPC and Egmont, pp. 99-119. 
Representative have already been mentioned above. 
In the context of CFSP two other aspects should 
however be included in this overview. Both have 
already featured in the CT.  
5.1  External action service (like CT) 
According to article 13a (3) TEU, the External 
Action Service (EEAS) shall assist the HR in 
fulfilling his mandate. It is supposed to work in 
cooperation with the diplomatic services of the 
member states and shall comprise officials from the 
General Secretariat of the Council, from the 
Commission and seconded staff from national 
diplomatic services. Its organisation and functioning 
still needs to be established by a Council decision 
agreed upon a proposal by the HR. As for the HR 
many issues still remain open concerning the EEAS, 
particularly its legal status and its institutional 
affiliation, which could be in the Council, in the 
Commission or somewhere outside the two (‘sui 
generis’).  
5.2  Permanent structured cooperation on 
defence matters (like CT) 
Permanent structured cooperation is a mechanism 
that was already included in the CT providing for 
cooperation on defence matters among a smaller 
group of member states (art. 28a (6) TEU, 28e 
TEU). Participation does not only depend on the 
political willingness of a member state, but also on 
objective criteria concerning military capabilities 
(i.e. “targeted combat units”, see article 1 of the 
‘Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation’). 
Permanent Structured Cooperation can be 
established by a qualified majority in the Council 
(article 28e (2) TEU). 
6.  Final provisions (Title VI TEU) 
6.1  Legal personality of the EU (like CT) 
Just like the CT, the ToL will introduce a single 
legal personality for the European Union (article 46a 
TEU) covering both the current European 
Community and the European Union. In a 
declaration to the ToL it is stated that the legal 
personality may not “in any way authorise the 
Union to legislate or to act beyond the competences 
conferred upon it by the Member States in the 
Treaties.” 
6.2  Voluntary withdrawal clause (like CT) 
This clause is also directly taken from the CT. It 
only regulates what would already have been 
possible in the past, since no member state would 
have been obliged to stay in the European Union 
against its will. The new provision (article 49a 
TEU) only makes this option visible and provides a 
procedure for an ‘orderly retreat’. It foresees  
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negotiations, but in case these fail, the member state 
can leave the Union two years after notifying the 
European Council of its intention. The voluntary 
withdrawal clause can thus be seen as a safeguard 
against unconsidered moves by national 
governments (e.g. in case a government comes to 
power after promising to leave the Union in the 
election campaign, it would at least have to wait for 
two years, if negotiations fail). 
6.3  Ordinary and simplified revision procedure 
(like CT) 
As in the CT, the ordinary revision procedure for the 
treaties introduced by the ToL foresees a 
Convention and an IGC (article 48 (2-5) TEU). A 
Convention does not have to be convened, if a 
simple majority in the European Council is reached 
and if the European Parliament gives its consent. As 
governments might want to avoid a Convention in 
the future, the European Parliament will be given a 
powerful tool: in order to grant its consent, it is 
likely to make demands on the content of future 
treaty revisions.  
A simplified revision procedure is foreseen for Part 
III of the TFEU, but still demanding a unanimous 
decision in the European Council. The decision 
“shall not increase the competences conferred on the 
Union in the Treaties” (article 48 (6) TEU). 
There are also two so-called ‘passarelle clauses’ that 
allow the move from unanimous decision-making to 
qualified majority voting and from a consultation 
procedure to co-decision (i.e. full involvement of 
the EP). Such a decision must be taken by unanimity 
in the European Council, by majority in the EP and 
it may not be taken on matters with military 
implications. More importantly, however, it can be 
stopped if any one national parliament voices its 
opposition within six months of the date of its 
notification. The two ‘passarelle clauses’ are thus 
very unlikely to play a significant role in the future. 
The ToL has introduced one – rather symbolic – 
clarification to article 48 TEU that was not already 
in the CT, stating that proposals for Treaty 
amendments may also serve to reduce the 
competences conferred on the Union.  
6.4  Accession criteria (like CT) 
Article 49 TEU is amended with a reference 
demanding that applicant countries have to respect 
and promote the values of the Union.  
III.  Treaty on the Functioning of the 
Union 
As a result of the fact that the European Union 
“shall replace and succeed the European 
Community” (article 1 TEU), the treaty name will 
also change: the Treaty establishing the European 
Community will be renamed ‘Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union’ (TFEU). 
From a functional point of view, one could argue 
that the TEU contains more general provisions, 
while the TFEU – as its name suggests – covers 
more detailed articles, which would have justified a 
certain hierarchy. However, like article 1 TEU, 
article 1 TFEU also states that both treaties have the 
same legal value. Consequently, there is no legal 
hierarchy between the two texts. Most governments 
rejected the idea that the TFEU could be interpreted 
in the light of the provisions of the TEU. 
As a detailed description of the changes in all policy 
areas would go beyond the scope of this paper, the 
following part will provide a general overview of 
the most important changes to the treaty. 
1.  Qualified majority voting and co-
decision become the “ordinary 
legislative procedure” (like CT) 
The most important change to the TFEU is 
undoubtedly a further extension of co-decision and 
qualified majority voting. This goes together with 
the fact that co-decision and qualified majority 
become the so-called “ordinary legislative 
procedure” (article 251 TFEU). The policy area that 
will be most broadly affected by this change is 
justice and home affairs, but there will also be many 
other policies shifted fully or partially under the 
ordinary legislative procedure, e.g. energy (art. 176 
a TFEU), tourism (art. 176 b TFEU), civil 
protection (art. 176 c TFEU), sport (art. 149 TFEU), 
structural funds (art. 161 (1) TFEU), incentive 
measures to protect human health (art. 152 TFEU) 
or space policy (art. 172a TFEU). 
2.  Extension of the ordinary legislative 
procedure to the whole annual budget 
(like CT) 
With this innovation the distinction between 
compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure will 
be abandoned, which means that the EP will have 
the final word for all categories of expenditure. In 
return, however, the multi-annual financial 
framework will determine the amounts of the annual 
ceilings as well as the appropriations for the various 
categories of expenditure and payment. 
3.  New title on energy (like CT) 
A new title on energy (Title XX) is added to the 
treaty, which had already been included in the CT. 
What the exact impact of this article will be in 
practice, however, remains to be seen. According to 
article 176a TFEU, it will give the EU a legal basis 
to “(a) ensure the functioning of the energy market;  
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(b) ensure security of supply in the Union; (c) 
promote energy efficiency and energy saving and 
the development of new and renewable forms of 
energy; and (d) promote the interconnection of 
energy networks.” However, the provision also 
contains important safeguards that ensure member 
states’ rights to determine the conditions for 
exploiting their energy resources, their choice 
between different energy sources and the general 
structure of their energy supply (so-called ‘energy-
mix’). Unanimity and mere consultation of the EP 
apply when measures are “primarily of fiscal 
nature.” 
In addition to the provision taken from the CT, the 
ToL has added a reference to the “spirit of solidarity 
between Member States”. The same reference has 
also been included in article 100 TFEU 
(“Difficulties in the Supply of Certain Products”). 
4.  Categories and areas of competences 
(like CT)  
The provisions on “categories and areas of 
competences” (article 2a to 2e TFEU) have been 
taken from the CT. They specify the different 
categories (exclusive competence, shared 
competence, competence to coordinate, support or 
supplement actions of member states) and list the 
policy areas falling into the respective categories. It 
is certainly not a rigid “Kompetenzkatolog” as 
initially demanded by Germany, but it does make 
clearer what the EU may (and may not) do. 
5.  Abolition of current third pillar and 
integration into Title IV (like CT) 
The formal abolition of the EU’s pillar-structure has 
already been mentioned above. Contrary to the 
second pillar (CFSP), the third pillar (police and 
judicial cooperation on criminal matters) will not 
only be ‘demolished’ pro forma, but also in 
substance.
10 Two main differences between the ToL 
and the CT should be mentioned however:  
(1) The UK and Ireland have negotiated a 
comprehensive opt-out for which the conditions are 
laid out in great detail in article 4a of the revised 
‘Protocol on the Position of the United Kingdom 
and Ireland in Respect of the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice’.  
(2) A veto for each national parliament has been 
introduced that allows it to stop a unanimous 
                                                 
10 Although some exceptions remain here as well; for 
greater detail see Sergio Carrera and Florian Geyer, The 
Reform Treaty & Justice and Home Affairs – Implications 
for the common Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 
CEPS Policy Brief No. 141, August 2007  
(http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1535). 
decision of the Council that would introduce 
qualified majority voting to the area of family law. 
The use of this ‘passarelle’ has therefore become 
even less likely than under the provisions of the CT. 
6.  Provisions on Services of General 
Interest (mostly like CT) 
The provision on services of general economic 
interest will be amended. Article 16 TFEU will 
make reference to article 3a TEU that mentions the 
respect of the Union for the “essential State 
functions” of member states. Article 16 TFEU will 
also provide a legal basis for EU regulations (by 
‘ordinary procedure’) that establish principles and 
set conditions “to provide, to commission and to 
fund such services”. 
A ‘Protocol on Services of General Interest’ has 
been added by the ToL that was not part of the CT. 
As regards the content of this protocol, however, it 
seems to be only of a clarifying character. 
Conclusion: More democratic, more 
efficient, more transparent? 
This overview has shown that the innovations of the 
Constitutional Treaty have to a very large extent 
been preserved in the ToL. The main differences can 
be summarised as follows: 
•  The symbolic elements of the CT have been 
abandoned. As explained, this appears as a minor 
detail from a legal perspective, but may have 
major implications for the future of the 
integration process. The stronger emphasis on 
national sovereignty and on the limits of EU 
competences also hints in this direction. 
•  The Treaty of Lisbon is again an amending treaty 
that will add another ‘layer’ of provisions to the 
‘acquis’. The legal foundations of the EU will 
thus become even more complex and the treaty 
itself is unreadable for the average citizen. 
•  Several member states negotiated substantial opt-
outs (UK and Ireland on JHA: UK and Poland on 
the application of the Charter), thus adding to the 
already existing ‘variable geometry’ among 
member states. 
•  Certain control mechanisms for national 
parliaments have been strengthened (subsidiarity 
check, vetoes on ‘passarelle clauses’). This holds 
the potential for a better implication of the 
national level in the EU-policy making process, 
but also carries the risk of national parliaments 
focussing on a defensive role as an ‘emergency 
break’ for European integration. 
At the beginning of the Constitutional Convention 
European leaders pleaded for a more democratic,  
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more efficient and more transparent EU. Judging the 
Treaty of Lisbon by these three criteria, the question 
remains whether it will make the EU… 
1. ….more democratic? Yes. 
Concerning this aspect the content stands in some 
contrast to the procedure. While the failed referenda 
on the Constitutional Treaty have led to more 
secretive negotiations than ever before, the content 
of the text does mean progress for EU democracy. It 
gives greater control to national parliaments, 
strengthens the power of the European Parliament as 
an equal co-legislator in many policy areas and 
might even make the European elections more 
attractive, as political parties now have an additional 
incentive to nominate candidates for the office of 
the Commission president before the elections. The 
treaty also introduces an element of direct 
democracy through the citizens’ initiative. 
2. …. more efficient? Maybe. 
It is impossible to pass definitive judgment on 
whether the EU will become more efficient as yet. 
Certainly the move towards more qualified majority 
voting will make agreement easier in a number of 
policy fields, especially in justice and home affairs. 
The impact of the new voting system in the Council 
(‘double majority’) is less likely to have a major 
impact as long as the ‘consensus style’ of Council 
negotiations is preserved. In any case, first results 
will only be visible in 2014. Future treaty revisions 
will hardly become easier either. Initial ideas in the 
Convention aimed at bringing certain parts of the 
treaties under a revision procedure by ‘super-
qualified majority (e.g. 80%), but they had already 
been discarded in the CT. The simplified revision 
procedure still maintains unanimity for all changes 
to the treaties and the ‘passarelle clauses’ are 
unlikely to be used. There is also some justified 
concern that the treaty reform may have 
concentrated too much on making each institution 
more efficient, but neglecting the impact of these 
reforms on the overall institutional balance. For 
example, it is certainly more efficient for the 
European Council to have a permanent president, to 
grant the Commission President more clout through 
an official election and to ‘merge’ the post of the 
current High Representative with that of the 
Commissioner for External Relations (and Vice-
President of the European Commission). However, 
it is difficult to predict how these three posts will 
interact, especially as regards the external 
representation of the EU and the provision of 
political leadership. It is difficult to deny a certain 
potential for ‘turf fights’ and much will depend on 
the personalities involved.  
 
3. ….more transparent? No. 
If the ToL has failed in one respect, then it is clearly 
in making the current treaties more understandable 
and transparent. On the contrary, the ToL will make 
the EU even more difficult to grasp due to a further 
increase in opt-outs, protocols and declarations. In a 
Union of 27 member states this might be 
unavoidable and a poor omen for future integration. 
** 
Finally, as regards general tendencies for the future, 
one can easily predict an increased use of ‘flexible 
integration’ mechanisms, be it inside or outside the 
treaties. The Treaty of Lisbon actively contributes to 
this development through the difficult treaty 
revision procedure, the opt-outs for the UK, Ireland 
and Poland, (slightly) more attractive provisions for 
‘enhanced cooperation’ and the introduction of the 
‘permanent structure cooperation’ on defence. This 
does not have to be negative, as long as on the one 
hand the door remains open for other member states 
that want to join later and no exclusive clubs are 
constituted outside the EU. On the other hand, opt-
outs should not become so broad or numerous that 
the character of the EU as a ‘community of values’ 
is undermined.  
The probable move towards more flexible 
integration also makes it more likely that the present 
IGC has been the last one for a long time. The heavy 
revision procedure combined with the experience of 
recent years will curb the appetite among decision-
makers for further comprehensive treaty reforms 
considerably. 
And what does the treaty mean for citizens’ 
support? Here again, the problem has certainly not 
been solved. The Constitutional Treaty, once 
envisaged as a remedy to the public’s 
disenchantment with the Union, turned into a 
problem itself and led to the most secretive treaty 
negotiations in a long time, when leaders tried to 
save the substance of the text. Today, little seems to 
be left of the ambitions “to bring  European 
institutions closer to the citizens.”
11 As has been 
shown in this paper, the Treaty of Lisbon does 
contain certain elements to increase citizens’ interest 
in EU decision-making. Let’s hope that leaders will 
also be wise enough to use and promote them. 
                                                 
11 See Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European 
Union, p. 2 (http://european-convention.eu.int/pdf/ 
LKNEN.pdf). 